Abstract. The progressive aging of the population poses an evident threat to the financial sustainability of pension systems based on a "pay-as-you-go" (PAYG) scheme. To cope with this threat, pension systems have undergone in many countries numerous reforms aimed at keeping people longer at work by increasing the statutory retirement age at which workers are legally allowed to retire. In terms of the effectiveness of such type of reforms, many questions still remain unanswered: Will people really work longer? Who is more likely to leave before the new legal retirement age?
Introduction
Population ageing is one of the most relevant demographic phenomenons affecting many countries in the world. The combination of low fertility rates and substantial gains in life expectancy -particularly at older ages -implies a substantial increase in the ratio of people aged 65 years and above to those in working age (15 to 64 years) over the next decades. In addition, many countries experienced a so-called baby boom in the 1950s and 1960s, followed by a so-called baby bust thereafter so that untypically large cohorts are followed directly by untypically small cohorts, worsening the ratio even further once the baby-boom cohorts reach age 65+. Such an outlook poses an evident threat to the financial sustainability of pension systems based on a "pay-as-you-go" (PAYG) scheme. To cope with this threat, pension systems have undergone numerous reforms in most industrialized countries over the past two decades. One of the aims of these reforms has been to keep people longer at work by increasing the statutory retirement age at which workers are legally allowed to retire and closing existing early retirement windows.
However, in terms of the effectiveness of such type of reforms, many questions still remain unanswered: Will people really work longer? By how much? Who is going to stay in the labour market and who is more likely to leave before the new legal retirement age? Are individuals saving enough to finance an early departure from the labour force that allows them to substitute smaller public pensions by additional private pension income?
To answer such questions it becomes extremely important to understand how individuals form their retirement plans and which factors affect their decisions. In this paper, we focus on subjective retirement expectations, analysing if and to what extent they are affected by such policy changes. At least two reasons motivate our work: first, if public policies aimed at altering retirement patterns are to be successful, they have to operate in the first instance by altering workers' expectations concerning the tradeoffs associated with retirement. To see if this is the case, we need to better understand the process by which workers formulate and alter their retirement expectations. Second, long term decisions, and in particular saving and investment decisions, are based on expectations about the future: among them, retirement expectations are likely to play a prominent role, so that understanding how public policies affect them is quite important for understanding saving behaviour and wealth accumulation. Furthermore, many studies have found that retirement expectations are pretty accurate in terms of their relations to the outcome (see e.g. Bernheim (1988 Bernheim ( , 1989 ; Dwyer and Hu (1999) ; Disney and Tanner (1999) ; Haider and Stephens (2007) ) and they pass different forms of rationality tests (see e.g. Bernheim (1989) , Benìtez-Silva and Dwyer (2002, 2005) ): an analysis of the effect of public policies on retirement expectations thus offers a reliable look at the future behaviour of the cohorts affected by the reform.
To identify the effect of an increase in the legal retirement age (LRA) on subjective retirement expectations we consider the legislative reform introduced in Germany in 2007, which will gradually increase the LRA of employees (but not that of other professional groups such as civil servants and self-employed) from 65 to 67 years from 2012 on. Given the slow phasing in of the reform, different cohort are affected differently by the reform, with some of the cohorts not being affected at all. These features offer therefore a nice quasi-experimental setting to properly single out the effect of the policy on expectations.
Using the SAVE survey, a representative panel of German households with a specific focus on saving and investment choices, we first estimate how the probability to retire before, at or after the legal retirement age has changed over time; in a second step we estimate by how much the individuals' expected retirement age (ERA) has increased as an effect of the reform.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 gives a short historical overview of the main reforms to the German pension system, with a special focus on the reform implemented in 2007; section 3 present the data used for the analysis; section 4 deals with the question of who plans an early retirement and who rather plans to work longer than the LRA, while section 5 asses the magnitude of the adjustment in the ERAs as an effect of the reform 2007. Section 6, finally, concludes.
The German pension system and the reform 2007
The German pension system was the first formal pension system in the world, designed by Bismarck nearly 120 years ago. It has been very successful in providing a high and reliable level of retirement income in the past at reasonable contribution rates, becoming a model for many social security systems worldwide. While the generosity of the German public pension system is considered a great social achievement, negative incentive effects of past reforms in the 1970s and 1980s and population aging are threatening the very core of the pension system. These have led to fundamental pension reforms since 1992.
Although the first reform in 1992 represented a first big step, it became soon clear that it was too little and to late to put the German pension system on a stable and sustainable path. After a failed attempt in 1998 to further reform the system a major set of reforms (commonly known as the "Riester-reform" after the name of the secretary of labor, Walter Riester, who successfully managed to pass the bill) was introduced.
The Riester reform,however, had been based on overly optimistic assumptions, so that in December 2002, the government therefore established a 'Commission on the Financial Sustainability of the Social Security Systems'. In its reform proposal in August 2003, the commission proposed first further cuts in pension levels by introducing a `sustainability factor ' into the benefit indexation formula and as a second measure, an increase in the normal LRA from 65 to 67. The first proposition was legislated in 2004, while the second with some delay in spring 2007.
The law indicated a gradual implementation of the new LRA, with the increases starting in 2012 and ending in 2030. Between 2012 and 2029, the LRA is adjusted first each year by one month from age 65 to 66, and then each year by two months from age 66 to 67. The phase-in is cohort-oriented, it will affect cohorts younger than 1947; for the 1964 and younger cohorts a statutory retirement age of 67 finally applies. In addition, eligibility ages for disability pensions were raised from age 63 to 65 from 2017 to 2029 for handicapped persons, while early retirement with deductions was raised from age 60 to 62. Some exceptions to these new rules were also contemplated in the 2007 reform. For long-time insured workers, disability pensions can still be received at age 63 without deductions if workers have at least 35 service years (until 2023) or 40 years (from 2024 on). Furthermore, since there were additional worries about the coverage for workers subject to extreme physical wear and tear due to long years of hard work, a new pension type was introduced making it possible for workers with a service life of at least 45 years to retire two years earlier without any actuarial adjustments.
1 Table 1 gives an overview of the new LRAs for the different birth cohorts. 
The data
The analysis in this paper is based on SAVE (Sparen und Altersvorsorge in This dataset is particularly well-suited for the purposes of the current study: the SAVE survey, in fact, not only collects extensive factual information on all the aspects of the household's balance sheet; it also offers information on actual health conditions and on relevant social and psychological aspects of the households, which are extremely important to understand the saving behaviour in the light of the most recent theoretical models proposed by behavioural economists. In particular, interviewees who are not yet retired have to answer the following question: "At which age do you expect to go into retirement or respectively to draw retirement benefits?". The same question is asked also with respect to the respondent's partner, as long as he or she is not retired: it has to be stressed here, that is the reference person who is reporting the We restricted the sample in several ways. As the implemented reform affects only employees, we discarded the self-employed, civil servants and farmers; furthermore, we discarded respondents who report to be casual workers or who are completely out of the labour force (retirees, students, home keepers). That leaves us with almost 3,000 observations distributed over 5 years. is a new feature in comparison with other samples (like the HRS for the USA) used so far in the literature, which focus more on older workers. The age structure of the sample appears to be ideal for the scope of our analysis, as in Germany it is especially the younger birth cohorts who will be fully affected by the recent pension reforms.
These young respondents, however, face bigger uncertainty concerning their retirement plans, so that their answers are likely to undergo bigger changes over time and to be less representative for their actual behaviour.
Second, the distribution of the main characteristics does not reveal a specific bias toward specific subgroups. On the contrary, the sample seems to offer a good variation allowing for an accurate description of the distribution and the determinants of subjective retirement expectations.
Finally, the structure of the sample appears to be pretty stable over time. In other words, the sample does not seem to suffer from a selective drop-out: we can therefore rule out that the observed trend are simply due to a change over time in the composition of the data.
An important aspect that needs to be mentioned is the phenomenon of item nonresponse. As in all surveys that deal with sensitive topics such as household finances, item nonresponse to sensitive questions is not ignorable. (2006) for a discussion and documentation on this issue.
These spikes (or focal points -FP) are related to institutional aspects of the German pension system: 60 years, for example, represent the age at which, before the 1992 reform, men were first allow to claim disability benefits and women were allow to enter early retirement.
The dominance of the distribution by spikes at "institutional" ages might suggest that little relevant information is provided by these responses. Indeed, looking at the For attempts to build up probability distributions for expectational variables of this type, see inter alia Dominitz and Manski, 1997; Hurd and McGarry (1995) , Juster and Smith (1997) and Manski (1990 Manski ( , 2004 Illustration 1: ERA distribution by sex Nonetheless, we can argue that the answers are still informative about individuals'
expectations. First, not-sophisticated individuals might have a specific retirement age in mind rather than a distribution of probabilities, and it could be difficult for them to translate such specific ages into probabilities. Second, reported retirement ages vary with individual characteristics in a reasonable manner: several studies find out that observable characteristics, known to affect actual retirement decisions, co-vary with retirement expectations in a similar way. They also find that the reported expectations are strong predictors of the actual age of retirement also after including a large number of observable characteristics.
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A further piece of evidence in favour of the informativeness of the answers especially in relation with the effect of a change in the LRA can be found looking at the evolution of the FPs over time for different cohorts. respondents appear therefore to adjust meaningfully their answers.
Who plans an early retirement?
In this section we want to look at factors affecting the decision of early or later retirement: which are the determinants of an early retirement? Do we observe any change in these determinants after the implementation of the reform? Table 4 reports the percentage of respondents planning to retire before, at or after the LRA by sex over time. As the LRA after the 2007 reform is in many cases not an entire number (individuals born in 1954, for example have to retire with 65 years and 8 months -see Table 1 for further details) while the reported ERAs can be only entire numbers (that is, the respondents can specify the age at which they plan to retire only in years, and not in years and months) in order to classify the answers in one of the three categories, we have to make some assumptions on how individuals are rounding. In the following we assume that individuals round their answers to the lowest entire number, so that individuals who have for example a LRA of 65 + x months and plan to retire exactly at the LRA, will report an ERA of 65 years. First of all we can observe a large part of the adjustment in the ERA took place It becomes therefore important at this stage to asses who plans an early departure from the labour market: indeed, if the increase in the legal threshold for retirement induces the more productive workers (who might have at the same time accumulated more savings during their life) to plan an early retirement, something has to be changed in the law, n order to avoid such an undesirable effect.
To answer this question we run therefore an ordered probit to see which determinants affect the probability of ending up in one of the three categories retiring before, at or after the legal retirement age.
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As the threshold that defines the three categories 8
Our dependent variable takes value 1 if the ERA is smaller than the LRA; 2 if they coincide and 3 if changes over time and across cohorts, we run separated regressions for the various cohorts and for the years before and after the implementation of the reform. Table 5 reports the estimated coefficients and their p-values.
We find that women are generally more likely to plan an early retirement than men:
the coefficient, however, is significant only for the younger cohorts. Probably older women who are still working (and therefore who are still in our sample) represent a self-selection of women with a higher propensity to work, and who therefore tend to retire later than average. Interestingly, for the younger cohorts in the years after the reform (i.e. 2007 to 2009) the coefficient becomes smaller and less significant:
younger women have probably revised their expectations in a stronger fashion than men. Nonetheless, the fact that relatively young women are still more likely to plan an early retirement might be cause of concern: women tend to have a less continuous employment history and are more often employed only part-time, so that they tend to accrue lower pension benefits. Furthermore, as women have on average a higher life expectancy, an early departure from the labour market means that they will have to live for a longer time on a meager pension.
Education appears to be be a significant determinant of retirement plans: better educated individuals (either in the form of a better secondary school leave certificate or in the form of a completed post-secondary education) are more likely to end up planning to retire at or even after the LRA. There are no big differences in the magnitude and/or in the significance of the coefficients in the years before and after the reform: if anything, an increase in the positive effect of the secondary school leaving certificate emerges for the cohorts born between 1958 and 1963, and for those born after 1963. This is a good news: if better educated individuals are also more productive, we can conclude that the higher threshold for retirement did not push productive workers prematurely out of the labour market. The results provide some evidence that individuals living in wealthier households are ERA > LRA. For individuals whose LRA after the reform is not an entire number, ERA and LRA are supposed to coincide if the ERA equals the lowest entire number in the LRA. more likely to plan an early retirement: although the accumulated financial wealth does not play any significant role in shaping the expectations concerning future retirement, the ownership of real estates or of assets which are specific for the old-age (such as occupational pension plans or private old-age provisions) affect negatively the retirement plans, at least for the older cohorts. Household's income appears to be a significant and negative determinant of the retirement plan for the younger cohorts.
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Actual smoking attitudes, here used as a proxy for future health status, are also a significant determinant of the retirement plans. However, while smokers belonging to the eldest cohorts are more likely to report a later retirement, actual smokers in the middle and younger cohorts are more likely to plan an earlier retirement. The positive sign of the coefficient for the older individuals could be due again to self-selection.
Older smokers are most probably long-time smokers; as our reference group consists of individuals who suffer no chronic health conditions, these smokers appear to have reached their middle age without suffering the negative consequences of smoking.
Their bodies, therefore, appear to be particularly resistant and they are comparative healthier: this pool of respondents, therefore might expect to live longer and in better conditions than the other (despite the smoking attitude), planning therefore to work also longer. On the contrary, younger smokers might expect to suffer from poor health in the future, so that they could be forced to retire before the LRA is reached.
It is worth to stress here, that while the sociodemographic characteristics as well as statements concerning health and expectations refer to the individual, the SAVE survey elicit wealth and income at the household level. The link between education and wealth and/or income is therefore less straightforward: we can still have poorly educated individuals living in rich households because of their marriage. Taken together our results tell a positive story: less educated individuals, more likely to suffer from poor health (due to their smoking attitudes), with a relatively continuous employment history and living in wealthier households are more likely to plan an early retirement. If that was true also before the increase in the LRA, it became even more so after year 2007. If the individuals will behave according to their reported plans, we can conclude that once the reform 2007 will be fully implemented, while the most productive workers will remain in the labour market, those who decide to quit appear to have saved enough (or at least more than the average) to affoed an early departure.
By how many years did the ERA increased?
After having characterised who is more likely to plan an early or a later retirement, we want now to explicit measure the effect of the reform on the ERA: did the reform 2007 induced any update of the ERA? If yes, by how many year did the ERA increase as effect of the reform? Figure 3 shows that on average the ERA increased over time for both genders; for women, however, the increase is even more pronounced so that over time the gap in the retirement expectations between men and women is by 2009 almost closed.
Illustration 3: ERA by sex and year
Moreover, we observe that younger cohorts (born 1964 or later) expect to retire on average significantly later than middle-aged (born between 1958 and 1963) or older cohorts and over time the increase in their ERAs is stronger. However, expectations so far have not been adjusted to the full extent, but remain at best roughly one year below the statutory retirement age. The upward trend is furthermore more accentuated for younger cohorts than for older cohorts (Figure 4 ). This evidence, however, cannot be causally interpreted, as the trend might be driven by other factors, not related with the reform 2007. For example, individuals may be simply revising their expectations upward because they get older: Dwyer and Da Silva, 2002 for example find that individuals tend to postpone their ERA as they get closer to their retirement age. So, the fact that the individuals in our sample simply get older over time (we have indeed a panel), may drive the upward trend. More generally, it could be that an upward trend in the ERA was already in place (maybe as an effect of previous reform of the pension system, which -as sketched in section 2, abolished some of the most common used possibility to claim early retirement).
To single out the effect of the reform on expectations, we rely therefore on a difference-in-differences (DD) approach. The basic idea of the DD estimator is to compare over time the outcomes of individuals who are affected by the reform with the outcomes of individuals who are not affected: the change in the outcome of the Illustration 4: ERAs over time by sex and birth cohort untreated group should identify any temporal variation in the outcome that is not due to the policy. Therefore, once we control for all the possible observable characteristics that may determine a difference in the outcome, any remaining difference in the ERA between the two groups is due to the reform. In doing so, we are assuming that any unobservable difference between treated and control remains constant over the period under analysis. The critical assumption underlying this estimator is that the control group represents the "right" counterfactual for the treated, that is, they should perfectly mirror the evolution in the ERAs of the "treated" in the case the reform had not taken place. It is therefore extremely important to choose the control group very carefully. In the following we focus only on the younger cohorts (born 1064 and later) which are fully affected by the reform (that is, they have to retire at 67 years). Two aspects, however, are cause of concern. First, it could be that ERAs of older individuals, who are closer to their retirement, are more stable over time, while ERAs of younger individuals, with many years to go before retirement and who are facing a much higher degree of uncertainty, might evolve with a different pace. Second, as we are analysing a panel dataset, selectivity of the older individuals might represent a problem. Indeed, we might expect that the sample of older employees becomes from year to year biased toward individuals with a higher preference for working: as the comparison group is mainly made up of individuals who can already retire (the younger individual is already 59 years and the median age is 62 years), individuals with a lower taste for working will choose to retire, dropping out of the sample. The remaining individuals in our sample are increasingly those with higher preferences for work and therefore with higher ERAs on average.
These two factors question the validity of the time-invariance assumption and therefore the validity of our identification strategy.
A second control group can be found in the self-employed. The idea here is to compare the outcomes of employees fully affected by the reform (born after 1964) with those of self-employed belonging to the same cohorts. As the individuals in both groups belong to the same cohorts and are therefore at the same stage of their lifecycle, we get rid of the first problem (i.e. the different time horizon that younger and older cohorts have when reporting their ERA). Furthermore, we have no reason to assume that in one group the panel selectivity should be different as in the other. The two groups have of course different underlying preferences for leisure, but the difference should stay constant over time and any observed difference in the evolution of their ERAs over time should be due to the fact that employees are affected by the reform and self-employed not.
Another choice that has to be done concerns the cut-off point, that is the years that correspond to the "before" and "after" period. Here we also made 2 different choices: Table 6 reports the results of the estimation. The coefficient of interest is that on the interaction term between the dummy for the period "after" the reform and the dummy identifying the treatment group.
The regression confirm the fact that much of the adjustment in the ERAs happened already in 2006: indeed, when we use 2007 as cut-off point to define our before/after time span, we find no significant difference between the treatment and control groups in the period after the reform. On the contrary, when 2006 is selected as threshold, the interaction term becomes significant.
We find that, on average, individuals belonging to the cohorts that are fully affected by the reform increased their ERAs over time more than individuals in the control group. In the period after the reform the average increase in the ERAs of individuals born after 1964 over that of employees not affected by the reform is about 1 years and three months, while when compared with self-employed belonging to the same birth cohorts, the average increase is about 1 years and 8 months. The null hypothesis that the coefficients on the interaction terms are equal to 2 (that is, the number of years by which the expectations of the individuals fully affected by the reform should be increased if these individuals fully incorporated the new LRA in their expectations) cannot be rejected by a Wald test. We can therefore conclude that the reform 2007 was extremely successful in shifting retirement expectations. Interestingly, the average ERA is still well below the LRA: when employees belonging to the younger cohorts are compared to self-employed belonging to the same cohorts (column 4 on Table 6), the average ERA for the treated after the reform turn out to be 62.7 years, that is, almost 3 years before the LRA. Nonetheless, if these individuals are going to behave coherently with their reported expectations, the increase of about 2 years in their ERA tells us that they will stay in the labour market longer than it would have been the case under the old institutional setting.
Conclusions
This paper contributes to the literature that examines individuals' retirement decisions and the effect that policy changes have on them. More specifically, we wanted to answer two questions: who is going to stay longer in the labour market and who plans an early retirement? By how much an increase in the legal retirement age shifts individuals' expected retirement age? To answer those questions we considered the legislative reform introduced in Germany in 2007, whose institutional settings offer a nice quasi-experimental setting to properly single out the effect of the policy on expectations.
We find out that less educated individuals, more likely to suffer from poor health (due to their smoking attitudes), with a relatively continuous employment history and living in wealthier households are more likely to plan an early retirement. If that was true also before the increase in the LRA, it became even more so after year 2007. If the individuals will behave according to their reported plans, we can conclude that once the reform 2007 will be fully implemented, while the most productive workers will remain in the labour market, those who decide to quit appear to have saved enough (or at least more than the average) to afford an early departure.
We also find that the reform succeeded in shifting the retirement expectations of the younger cohorts: using a difference-in-differences estimator, we find that on average the ERAs of individuals born after 1963 increased in the period after the implementation of the reform by about 2 years. Although the average ERA of those individuals is still below the LRA, the shift in the expectations means that these workers are going to stay in the labour market longer than they would have been without the increase in the LRA. Despite being still preliminary, these results provides some evidence about the effectiveness of reforms aimed at keeping productive people longer at work.
